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Abstract
In the period 2001-2004 two major reforms followed in Belgium: a personal income tax reform (2001) and a
reform of social security contributions for low skilled employees (2004). Using a discrete hours labor supply
model, this paper assesses the impact of these reforms on aggregate labor supply of males and females in
couples. Results suggest that the reforms had a positive (but moderate) e®ect on both participation and
hours worked. Targeted reductions in social security contributions, however, proved to be more e®ective
than the newly introduced tax credit on low earnings.
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Recently cross-country empirical studies on the potential negative e®ects of the tax burden on
employment have been surveyed by De Haan, Sturm, and Volkerink (2003). They conclude that,
although the overall e®ect of the tax wedge is probably smaller than earlier estimates, its ef-
fects are greater in continental European countries, due to an intermediate level of labor market
centralization.
Particularly harmful are the e®ects of heavy taxation on the employment level of low skilled
workers (Layard and Nickell, 1999). High tax wedges and high replacement rates1 are the main
causes of persistent lower employment rates in the less skilled population.
This holds also for Belgium, where low skilled employment rate lies just above 55%. In the
case of women, and even more so married women, the picture is particularly dramatic. According
to recent Labour Force Survey statistics, slightly less than 40% of married women with less than
secondary education are in employment.
A signi¯cant tax reform was already introduced in Belgium over the period 1988-1993 (Decoster,
Standaert, Valenduc, and Van Camp, 2002). The reform implied a shift from a joint family taxation
(which is known to have strong disincentive e®ects on married women's labor supply) towards a
broadly individualized system. Other aspects of the reform were (i) the broadening of the tax base,
(ii) the abolition of the highest marginal tax rates (the highest marginal tax rate was as high as
70.8%), (iii) the collapse from 14 tax brackets into 7, the abolition of the zero tax bracket and of
several deductible expenses and the introduction of new tax credits. Unfortunately, no study has
yet focused on the potential labor supply responses to such deep reform.
Traditionally, employment policy in Belgium has focused on demand side measures, probably
due to the high level of structural unemployment, mainly linked to the heavy industrial restruc-
turing process. The reduction of employers' Social Security Contributions (SSC) for low paid
workers has been promoted as early as 1988 by a group of economists known as `the group of the
seventy-two' as a means to increase low skilled employment. At that time the proposed reduction
was in the order of 22,500 BEF per year, i.e. approximately 65 EUR per month in current values.
Using the macro-model HERMES, Van der Linden (1991) estimated that such reform would have
reduced unemployment by around 25,000 units. SSC reductions have indeed characterized most of
the 90s, ¯rst following a rather scattered pattern. Since 1994, however, the reduction of SSC has
been generalized to all low paid workers. Using a demand driven aggregated model and reason-
able hypotheses of labor demand elasticity, IMF economists (IMF, 2001) have estimated that the
reduction in the tax wedge will bring about an increase in the employment rate of 1 percentage
point, which is in line with previous estimations based on HERMES.
Recent reforms have tried to tackle the inactivity trap from a supply perspective. Starting from
1999 the federal government has taken major steps to reduce the tax burden on labor. The ¯rst
measure was the introduction of substantial reductions in employees' SSC for low paid workers.
1 Replacement rates are usually de¯ned as the ratio of disposable income when unemployed or inactive to disposable
income in employment. For an analysis of replacement rates across EU countries see Immervoll and O'Donoghue
(2003)
1In a second step the government passed a bill for the progressive abolition of the Contribution
Compl¶ ementaire de Crise (CCC), an additional surcharge that had been introduced during the
tough budgetary crisis of the early 90s.
In 2001 the Belgian parliament voted a law for a new reform of the personal income tax,2
which, amongst other purposes, included a supposed positive e®ect on labor supply. The reform
was estimated to have a budgetary cost of 3.33 billion EUR, which corresponded to a decrease in
tax revenue by almost 10%.
In year 2004, a year before full implementation of the tax reform, a second reform amended
some aspects of the tax regime. In particular the newly introduced tax credit on low earnings was
replaced by a substantial increase in low skilled employees' SSC.
This paper assesses the impact of the last two reforms on the labor market, focusing on the sub-
population of households where both spouses are in working age and have °exible labor supply (i.e.
not in full time education, not disabled and not retired).3 Using a methodology largely exploited
in the recent economic literature on ex-ante evaluations of tax bene¯t reforms, this paper signi¯-
cantly extends previous static analysis, such as those performed in Vallenduc (2002). Employment
dynamics, so far only analyzed in the framework of partial equilibrium macro-models, such as in
Saintrain (2002), are hence analysed taking into account the heterogeneity of the population in
working age, using a structural supply-driven microeconomic model.
In the following we assume that there are no feedback e®ects due to the interaction of labor sup-
ply and demand, nor do we consider the potential e®ects of involuntary unemployment. Neglecting
the latter may indeed lead to severe bias in the estimate of labor supply elasticities, while aggre-
gated behavioral e®ects tend to be overestimated, (Bargain, Caliendo, Haan, and Orsini, 2005).
It might be argued, however, that neglecting involuntary unemployment as well as potential feed-
back e®ects will lead to an upper bound estimate of the behavioral adjustments. The analysis will
therefore provide an optimistic - or upper bound estimate of the impact of the reforms.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 describes both reforms in detail and show the
impact of the reform on two typical households; section 3 presents the data and the econometric
framework; section 4 analyzes the budgetary impact of the reforms and section 5 describes potential
behavioral adjustments. Conclusions are drawn in section 6.
2 The 2001 Tax Reform and the Employment Bonus
In August 2001 the Belgian Parliament passed a Tax Reform bill (Loi du 10 ao^ ut 2001), which
implemented the ¯scal reform announced by the federal government in its Federal Policy Plan of
17th October 2000. The reform is being phased in progressively between 2001 and 2005. One
interesting feature of the reform is that it includes both a generalized tax reduction and the
introduction of a refundable earned income tax credit. The principal axes of the reform are:
2 De CallataÄ y (2002) argues that the term `tax reform' is partially misleading given the substantial continuity of
the new tax code with the previous one, and prefers the term `tax reduction'.
3 Self employed have also a °exible labor supply. The information on hours worked, however is often incomplete,
and even gross earnings are frequently reported with a high degree of approximation.
21. the introduction of an earned income tax credit - CIBRAP hereafter4 ;
2. the increase in deductions for working expenses;
3. the broadening of the central tax brackets;
4. the abolition of the highest marginal tax rates,
5. and the alignment of the tax exempt income quotas for singles and married couples.
In 2004, however, the CIBRAP was replaced by the `Bonus µ a l'emploi' - Employment Bonus,
BE hereafter - an additional reduction of low wage employees' SSC.
These measures, representing together around 85% of the total cost of the reform, will be
examined in depth in the following sections. For details on the other measures, as well as on the
reform of corporate taxation, implemented through a second tax bill in 2002 (Loi du 24 d¶ ecembre
2002) see Ministµ ere de Finances (2002), Ministµ ere de Finances (2003), Carey (2003) and Vallenduc
(2002). The following sections explain in some detail the content of the reform. An overview of
the reform is summarized in table 1.
2.1 The CIBRAP
The CIBRAP was introduced with the explicit aim of making employment ¯nancially more at-
tractive, especially to youngsters and women, and - at the same time - redistributing income in an
e®ort to reduce the poverty risk of less productive workers (Ministµ ere de Finances, 2002). Most
remarkable are the words of the Finance Minister himself:
`The idea behind the earned income tax credit is that the organization of solidarity must go be-
yond the simple passive compensation for people out of employment and extend to low-paid workers.
Such an instrument aims at both promoting employment and ¯ghting poverty. Below a certain in-
come threshold, the tax credit becomes a complementary income transfer. It is therefore similar
to other negative tax systems, such as the `Working Families' Tax Credit', implemented in Great
Britain by the Blair Government' (Reynders, 2001, p.7) { [translated from French].
In fact, the Belgian CIBRAP turned out to be very di®erent from the WFTC and the EITC,
and is more similar to the Dutch `arbeidskorting' introduced with the 2001 tax reform. Like
the latter, the CIBRAP is fully individualized and not means-tested on household income, but,
similarly to the Anglo-Saxon measures, it is refundable.5
4 Cr¶ edit d'Imp^ ot pour les Bas Revenus d'Activit¶ e Profesionnelle.
5 Individualization of the bene¯t implies - for example - that both members of a couple are potentially eligible
and more importantly - the income of one partner has no e®ect on the eligibility of the other. The main drawback
of the family based IWBs is therefore avoided. On the other hand, the broad eligibility conditions imply that the
amount of the bene¯t is much lower than the WFTC. Also, di®erently from the WFTC and the PPE, the CIBRAP
is not scaled according to family conditions, so that the number of dependants is not taken into account. Such a
feature may cause the bene¯t to be quite ine®ective in tackling inactivity traps, as means-tested bene¯ts like the
MINIMEX are scaled on household size. The net replacement rate of inactivity by employment will therefore be
higher for single women on social assistance than for single mothers.
3Other characteristics of the tax credit closely match the characteristics of the instruments that
already exist in other countries: the bene¯t is phased in and phased out with a relatively low
taper, it is conditional on working at least 13 hours and it is administered by the ¯scal authorities.
Eligibility starts when net earned income (i.e. gross earned income net of SSCs and imputed
professional expenses) is above EUR 3,750. Between this lower threshold and EUR 5,000 the
bene¯t will be phased in very sharply at a rate of 40.5% (i.e. the bene¯t increases by EUR 40.5 for
every EUR 100 earned between EUR 3,750 and EUR 5,000). Between EUR 5,000 and EUR 12,530
EUR the bene¯t amounts to EUR 506 and between EUR 12,530 and EUR 16,280 the bene¯t is
phased out at a rate of 13.5%, meaning that EUR 13.5 of bene¯t are lost for every additional EUR
100 earned. In 2003 (respectively 2004), the phase-in rate will be 7.2% (20%) and the phase-out
rate will be 2.4% (6.7%) while the maximum amount of the bene¯t will be EUR 90 (EUR 253).
One year before its full implementation, however, the CIBRAP was replaced by the EB: an
increased reduction on SSC of low wage employees. The credit is however still working for self-
employed, as the latter do not bene¯t from the reductions in social security contributions.
2.2 Employment Bonus
The term `Employment Bonus' is somewhat misleading, and has generated some confusion in the
public debate. The bonus is indeed a structural reduction on quarterly SSC paid by low wage
employees. The ¯rst reduction had been introduced in 1999. In 2001 it consisted of 81.8 EUR
per month, for full time equivalent gross employment incomes between 877 and 1,147 EUR.6 The
bene¯t was then phased out with a rather sharp taper rate of 36.5%, to be fully exhausted at 1,367
EUR. Following the introduction of the new bonus, the base reduction will reach 140 EUR in
2006. The minimum income threshold has been abolished, while the upper threshold was brought
to 1,210 EUR per month. After this level the reduction is phased out with a taper of 17.8%, to
be fully exhausted at an equivalent monthly full time gross income of 2,000 EUR. In principle, a
minimum wage legislation applies in Belgium. In 2001 full time minimum wage was 1,140 EUR per
month. This implies that the bonus should never exceeds SSC due. In some minor cases (mostly
for young apprentices) the minimum wage legislation does not apply. In this case the bonus may
even become refundable.
The appealing feature of the bonus is its link with equivalent full time earnings: gross earnings
are ¯rst transformed in full time equivalent, then the maximum reduction to which a worker
might be entitled is scaled to the amount of hours worked. This way, employees working full time
are entitled to the full reduction, while part time employees will only have half of the maximum
reduction. This feature is indeed an improvement with respect to the previous CIBRAP: the EB
clearly distinguish between low productivity and low e®ort (thus avoiding the part-time premium
implicit in the CIBRAP), and low wage workers bene¯t from the increase in net income immediately
(instead of having to anticipate next year's tax reimbursement).
6 This ¯gures refer to white collar workers. For blue collars workers the maximum amount and the income limits
are slightly higher due to di®erences in the social security regime.
42.3 Tax allowance for professional expenses
According to Belgian tax law, lump sum deductions for work-related expenses are computed using
a progressive earning brackets system. The tax reform will increase deductions for low salaries by
increasing the deduction rate in the ¯rst income bracket. Earnings in the range between 0 and
EUR 4,320 will bene¯t from an additional deduction of 5% in 2005 (as a transitory measure the
additional deduction will be 3% in 2003 and 2004).
2.4 Broadening of the central tax brackets
Although the overall in°ation level was signi¯cantly lower than in previous decades, the suspension
of indexation of tax brackets during the 90s increased the overall progressivity of the tax system.
The ¯scal drag resulted in an increased tax burden on low and medium incomes. The improvement
of the main macroeconomic indicators has allowed for the reintroduction of a full indexation of
the tax brackets starting from tax year 2001. Moreover, the tax reform will stepwise reshape
progressivity in the middle tax brackets by broadening the middle-lower brackets and narrowing
the middle-upper brackets. The 30 and 40% marginal tax rate brackets will be expanded at the
expense of the 45% tax bracket. The reform will concentrate on the middle to lower part of the
distribution in the ¯rst phase, and it will be extended to higher earnings in 2005. The broadening
of the central tax bracket is the most expensive measure of the tax reform as it substantially
increases the disposable income of a wide range of taxpayers (83% of taxpayers according to
Reynders (2001)), with more substantial increases concentrated in the middle of the distribution.
2.5 Abolition of the highest marginal tax rates
The fourth measure in the ¯rst pillar is clearly targeted at higher incomes: the two highest marginal
tax rate brackets (55 and 52.5% respectively) are collapsed and - in a second step - merged with
the third highest tax bracket (at 50%). This corresponds to a drop of 5% in the highest bracket
and of 2.5% in the second highest bracket.
2.6 Alignment of tax exempt basic personal allowance for couples and singles
The most expensive measure is the alignment of the lump sum tax exemption of singles and married
couples. The basic personal tax deduction for married couples increases in two steps from EUR
4,350 to EUR 4,540 and in 2005 from EUR 4,540 to EUR 5,480. This measure implies increased
tax deductions by almost 25%, although the bene¯ts are likely to be concentrated on households
in the middle of the distribution. The personal tax deduction is in fact not refundable, so only
households whose pre-deduction tax liability is higher than the full amount of the credit will fully
bene¯t from the new measure. This measure is likely to have a signi¯cant impact on the labor
supply of secondary earners in couples, most often women.
52.7 Pre and post reform budget lines
The e®ect of the reform may best be represented by comparing pre and post reform budget sets.
In ¯gure 1 this is done for a single breadwinner household and for a two earner household. Both
households also have two young dependent children (aged 4 and 6). The pictures show the increase
in disposable income, as working hours increase from 0 to 80 hours per week. In the ¯rst case,
gross earnings start from zero, while in the second case initial gross earnings correspond to full
time gross earnings of one of the spouses. The hourly wage is 6.6 EUR, which correspond to the
2001 minimum wage.7
In the case of the single breadwinner household, the most striking feature is the °at segment
that goes up to almost 32 hours worked per week. Indeed the minimum income scheme, as it
is means tested on net household income, imposes an implicit 100% tax rate on labour market
income.8
This pictures clearly shows that in complex tax and bene¯t environments, characterized by
generous income support schemes, reductions in the tax burden are not per se su±cient to modify
the unskilled's ¯nancial incentives to take up work.
Following the reform, the disposable income when working part time (or 3/4 of a full time) is
exactly the same as before the reform, which in turn is almost the same as the disposable income
when not working at all. The reform however clearly increases disposable income when working
full time. In the case of the ¯rst reform, however, there is a small peak in disposable income
when working 38 hours per week. After this threshold disposable income increases at a lower
rate as the CIBRAP is tapered away. By hourly wages slightly higher than the minimum wage,
this peak comes even before. This `part time premium', on the other hand, is not present in the
second reform. Given that the reduction is social security contributions is proportional to working
hours, the bene¯t increases the net wage of the low skilled. The second reform therefore clearly
distinguishes between low skill and low e®ort.
The di®erence between the two reforms is even clearer in the case of two earner households.
Between 24 and 38 hours worked, disposable income is higher under the ¯rst reform. The two
reforms are almost equivalent when working full time, while the second reform is clearly more
advantageous when working over time. Again the picture refers to a couple where both spouses
work at the minimum wage. For hourly wages above the minimum wage, the CIBRAP creates an
unambiguous advantage in working less than full time (indeed the incentive to work part time is
stronger the higher the hourly wage - at least until a certain threshold).
The two pictures give already an idea of the possible e®ects of the reforms: in both cases there
is a clear incentives for the less skilled population too take up work. The CIBRAP, however, may
push secondary earners to take up a part time job, while the EB does not preset an implicit part
time premium. For the medium and highly skilled population, disposable income in work increases
7 Budget sets for higher hourly wages were also produced and are available upon request.
8 Increased family bene¯ts for dependent children are also tapered away as gross earnings increase. The double
means testing of minimum income and additional family bene¯ts lead to a poverty trap in the very ¯rst part of the
budget set.
6even more (in percentage terms). However, the labour supply adjustments will depend crucially
on the interaction between substitution and income e®ects. In order to consistently account for
these e®ects in a heterogeneous population, we need to set up a methodological framework that
allows us to recover the preference structure of the working population. This is done in the next
section.
3 Tax-bene¯t reforms and labor supply: a methodological
framework
The importance of the reforms implemented in the US and in the EU in the last decades has fostered
a rich literature on the impact of changes in the budget constraint on labor supply. Techniques
based on microdata, allow for a full analysis of the distribution of costs and bene¯ts of economic
reforms and provide better estimates of potential labor supply e®ects.
A variety of methodological approaches have been used for in-depth analysis of the labor supply
impact of tax reforms. Such studies have been of crucial importance to evaluate policy measures
in terms of costs and bene¯ts and potential distortions on the behavior of di®erent social groups.
Most approaches nevertheless are ex-post. Given the time delay in the availability of data such
analysis are mostly of historical interest.
Ex-ante evaluations however are also possible. The latter rely on fully structural models of
labor supply, on a detailed microsimulation model and on a su±ciently large database. The
microsimulation model allows to reproduce the budget constraint for each household, i.e. the
latent set of working time and consumption alternatives, while the structural model rationalizes
observed behavior.
3.1 The data
This study relies on the most recent wave of the PSBH, i.e. the 11th wave collected in 2001 and
containing information on the incomes of year 2000. The survey covers about 7,000 individual living
in approximately 3,000 households. Unfortunately the 11th wave was the last wave of the survey,
so that it will not be possible to assess the reform ex-post using techniques based on microdata
(e.g. di®erence in di®erences). Descriptive statistics of the adult population are presented in table
2.
3.2 Mod¶ et¶ e
Mod¶ et¶ e is a microsimulation software developed by Dulb¶ ea-ETE in the framework of the EU project
EUROMOD. It runs on PSBH data and it allows to simulate income assistance, child bene¯ts,
taxes and social security contributions. Pensions and unemployment bene¯ts are not simulated
as the PSBH does not collect all necessary information on past employment records. For more
details, see Joyeux (1999).
73.3 Behavioral model and econometric framework
Traditional approaches, based on the estimation of continuous labor supply functions, have proven
computationally cumbersome even in the simplest case, let alone in the more complex cases in
which multiple welfare programme participation, the social stigma of bene¯t take up and the ¯xed
cost of labor supply are considered. Recently, however, the analysis has been greatly simpli¯ed
by the discrete approach proposed by van Soest (1995). Such models explicitly recognize the
institutional constraints on labor supply which result in a limited set of working time alternatives
(inactivity, some part-time categories, full-time and over-time).
Most importantly, however, the computational burden of estimating labor supply functions
boils down to ML estimation of a more or less articulated conditional logit function.
Once preference parameter are estimated, optimal behavior conditional to the post reform
budget constraints is used to predict post reform participation and working time decisions.9
Discrete choice models of labor supply are based on the assumption that a household can choose
among a ¯nite number J +1 of working hours (J positive hours and non-participation); each hour
j=0,...,J corresponds to a given level of disposable income Cij (we suppose here that choice j=0 cor-
responds to non-participation) and each discrete bundle of leisure and income provides a di®erent
level of utility. The approach has become standard practice as it provides a straightforward way
to account for taxes and bene¯ts, hence nonlinear and nonconvex budget sets, and the joint labor
supply of spouses. In e®ect, choices j=0,...,J in a couple correspond simply to all the combinations
of the spouses' discrete hours. We assume that females may choose between working 0, 20, 40
or 50 hours, while men may work 0, 40 or 50 hours,10 the database contained almost no case of
males in couples working part-time. The interaction of the two choice generates 12 alternative
characterized by triplets of disposable income, leisure of the female spouse and leisure of the male
spouse. It should be noted here that the term leisure should be intended as non labor market
time. Household's utility Vij derived by household i from making choice j, correspond to the sum
of the deterministic part of the utility Uij, which is assumed to depend on a function of spouses'
leisures Lfij, Lmij, disposable income Cij (equivalent to aggregate household consumption in a
static framework) and household characteristics Zi, and of a random term ²ij, interpretable as an
optimisation error:
Vij = U(Hfij;Hmij;Cij;Zi) + ²ij: (2)
9 See van Soest (1995), Keane and Mo±t (1998), Hoynes (1996), Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000),
Van Soest and Das (2000), Bonin, Kempe, and Schneider (2002), Bargain (2004) and Haan and Steiner (2004).
10 Hours worked were censored at 80 hours per week and discretized according to the following rule:
(1)
H = 0;8h 2 [0;10]
H = 20;8h 2 [11;34]
H = 40;8h 2 [35;44]
H = 50;8h 2 [45;80]
8When the error term ²ij is assumed to be identically and independently distributed across
alternatives and households according to a EV ¡I distribution, McFadden (1973) proves that the
probability that alternative k is chosen by household i is given by:





The likelihood for a sample of observed choices can be derived from that expression and max-
imized to estimate the parameters of function U. When actual working hours are used, the econo-
metrician assumes that individuals choose freely their working hours and face no demand-side
constraints.
In the following, we assume a quadratic speci¯cation of the utility function as in Blundell,
Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000). Hence, the utility function of a couples household has the
following form:
Uij = ®cCij + ®ccC2
ij + ®hfHfij + ®hhfHf2
ij + ®hmHmij + ®hhmHm2
ij (3)
+®chfCijHfij + ®chmCijHmij + ®hmhfHfijHmij:
We assume that preferences vary across households through taste-shifter: (age, number of small
children) on income and leisure coe±cients:
®c = ®c0 + ®c1X1 (4)
®hf = ®lf0 + ®lf1X2
®hm = ®lm0 + ®lm1X3:
We follow van Soest (1995) and introduce a dummy variable for the part time ¯pt. Dummy
variable may capture di®erent aspects not explicitly treated in the model: search costs, rationing
e®ect and dynamic maximization.
For workers with observed wages, gross income across di®erent labor supply alternatives was
computed assuming a constant hourly wage rate. For inactive and unemployed workers hourly wage
is not observed. The latter was therefore estimated on the whole sample of individuals in working
age (either employed, unemployed or inactive)and imputed for males and females supplying zero
hours. For females, where the censoring e®ect is likely to be more signi¯cant, we have used a
Heckman correction model. In the case of males the hypothesis of null correlation between the
residuals of the labor supply and the wage equation could not be rejected, so we used a standard
regression model estimated on the sample of employees. Estimates of the wage equations are
presented in table 3. Coe±cients all have the expected sign, and the inverse Mill's ratio (lambda)
hints at a signi¯cant selection bias for females. In particular the constant for female wage is
somewhat lower than that of males, while the e®ects of schooling and potential experience have
a similar order of magnitude. The prediction error is given by the RSME, and - as expected - is
9slightly larger for females than for males. The error are nevertheless in the order of magnitude of
other recent studies (Laroque and Salanie, 2002).
Once real and predicted hourly wages have been obtained for all adult in the sample, we impute
the household gross income corresponding to the di®erent working time alternatives and, using the
microsimulation model, we are able to compute the corresponding set of disposable incomes. These
are summarized in table 4.
Parameter estimates for the behavioral model are shown in table 5. The results are in line with
theoretical predictions and recent empirical ¯ndings. The coe±cients imply marginally decreasing
utility of consumption and leisure. Together with the interaction terms, these coe±cients determine
the elasticity of labor supply. The preference for leisure displays a clear pattern with respect to age
and number of small children. Observed heterogeneity on the other hand does not seem to explain
the preference for income. The derivatives with respect to leisure show that for a signi¯cant share
of the population positive monotonicity in leisure is not respected. As stressed by Euwals and van
Soest (1999), there is no necessity to restrict preferences relative to the taste for leisure. With
respect to income, however, preferences are well behaved, and no restriction had to be imposed in
the estimation.
The quality of the model's predicting power may be best judged by comparing the observed
and predicted frequencies for each alternative. The predicted frequencies, reported in table 6 are
obtained by averaging up, over the whole sample, each household's probability of choosing a given
regime.
4 Budgetary cost
The measures simulated in the present study represent the core of the tax reform (and they absorb
around 85% of the estimated budgetary cost). Minor aspects of the reform, as well as transitory
measures, will not be considered. We simply simulate the ¯nal e®ects of the reform, as if it had
been instantaneously implemented in 2001. Table 7 compares the o±cial estimated budgetary cost
of the planned personal income tax reform with the estimates produced by the tax bene¯t model
Mod¶ et¶ e. It also shows the estimated cost of the EB and of the ¯nal reform. The EB is estimated
to have a budgetary cost of around 600 EUR millions per year. This is not too far from the ¯gure
of 621 EUR millions budgeted by the Minister of Employment. As a result of the subsidy on SSC,
however, taxable income increases. As a consequence of all interactions in the tax bene¯t system,
the two reform are comparable in terms of direct budgetary cost: the total simulated cost of the
¯rst version of the tax reform is 3,146 EUR billions per year, while the ¯nal reform should cost
3,149 EUR billions per year.
With respect to the personal income tax reform only, the estimate produced via Mod¶ et¶ e ex-
ceeds the `o±cial' predicted budgetary cost by around 25%. O±cial costs were estimated through
SIRe, a microsimulation model developed by the Ministry of Finance, which is based on around
22,000 tax ¯les. This di®erence is hardly surprising as the distribution of incomes in tax ¯les
and the distribution of income according to income surveys are often di®erent. Moreover, Mod¶ et¶ e
10is probably not fully suited for computing aggregated e®ects, given the small sample size of the
database on which it relies. The estimated cost of the CIBRAP is nevertheless very close. 90%
of the tax credit would have accrued to employees. Indeed in the second version of the reform,
the cost of the tax credit for self employment income is down just 46 EUR billions. The biggest
discrepancy, in relative terms, was due to the cost of the abolition of the highest marginal tax rates.
This discrepancy might be explained by a mix of underreporting and approximation in Mod¶ et¶ e's
simulation of taxable income. On the one hand, tax ¯les may indeed underreport sources of income
that are partially captured in income distribution surveys and on the other hand, households in
the middle to upper part of the income distribution are usually able to deduct signi¯cant expenses
(pension savings, health care, investments) that are captured by the microsimulation model SIRe,
but not by Mod¶ et¶ e.
As stated in the introduction, the budgetary cost of the reform will imply a loss of tax revenue
of around 10% (the progressive implementation of the reform is nevertheless likely will reduce
this cost). This corresponds to about 1.3-1.6% of the 2001 GDP(according to o±cial and own
estimates respectively). The most expensive measure is the increase in the exempted quota for
married couples (around 35% of the total budget). The second most expensive measure is the
broadening of the central tax brackets. Again this is not surprising, as the e®ect of this measure is
expected to cover more than 80% of all taxpayers. The CIBRAP and the EB (plus the CIBRAP
for self employed) represent the third most important measures in terms of budgetary e®orts.
5 Labor supply responses
In the present non-linear model, labor supply elasticities cannot be derived analytically but it is still
possible to simulate numerically the impact of a marginal increase in gross hourly wages on hours
of work and participation. Instead of the aggregating frequencies - as done in table 6, we follow the
calibration method which is consistent with the probabilistic nature of the model at the individual
level.11 Mean elasticities presented in table 8; bootstrapped con¯dence intervals are obtained by
drawing 100 times from the asymptotic distribution of the estimators and re-calibrating for each
draw.
Female and male labour supply elasticities where estimated at .20 and .18 respectively. Al-
though on average female elasticities seem to be somewhat higher than male elasticities, the con-
¯dence interval partially overlap - meaning that the null hypothesis that elasticities are equal may
not be rejected. Few Belgian recent studies on labor supply elasticity that use a similar method-
ology. Orsini (2005) estimates labour supply elasticities for female in couples. The estimated
elasticity is slightly higher (.27), but the model is partially di®erent as the author models female
labour supply according to a male chauvinist framework, assuming male labour supply as ¯xed.
11 It simply consists in drawing all random utility terms from the relevant distribution (i.e. EV ¡ I) and for each
observations until a perfect match between predicted and observed situations is obtained for each household. These
draws are used for predicting labor supply responses to a shock on wages or a tax reform (i.e. in the deterministic
part of the utility function), and averaging over a large number of draws provide robust transition matrices (Creedy
and Kalb, 2005).
11Overall, elasticities are small and mostly driven by changes in the participation rate (both for
males and for females) rather than by changes at the intensive margin. It is however likely that
some of the inactive people are indeed rationed, i.e. their labour supply is positive although they
are observed to supply zero hours. Bargain, Caliendo, Haan, and Orsini (2005) analyse the impact
of labour market rationing on labour supply elasticities. They conclude that labour supply elastic-
ities tend to be smaller when accounting for rationing from the demand side. Indeed labour supply
elasticities are driven by the participation decision and involuntary unemployed are already sup-
plying positive hours, so the margin for positive participation decisions becomes much smaller in a
rationed labour market. Moreover, since the e®ect of rationing tends to be stronger for males than
for females, labour supply elasticities of males in couples tend to be more biased (overestimated)
than those for female in couples, since a larger share of the latter is indeed voluntary unemployed.
Net increases in employment and working hours (in Full Time Equivalent - FTE) are shown in
table 9. If the ¯rst reform had been fully implemented, labor supply would have increased by around
28,000 units. The increase in hours, expressed in FTE is in the same range of 24.000 units. This
result is pretty much in line with the estimates of the Federal Planning Bureau (Saintrain, 2002).
FPB, however, adopts a demand driven macro framework. What is most of interest, however, is
the decomposition of the employment and hours e®ect, by measure. We then see that the CIBRAP
has indeed a positive participation e®ect, but the latter is partially outweighed by the negative
impact on hours worked of those males and especially females who are already in employment. For
some of them at least the CIBRAP entails an incentive to shorten working times.
In the second version of the reform, the same does not happen. The reduction in working time
of those already in employment is virtually zero for females and slightly higher for males. 12 The
incentive to take up work, on the other hand, is much stronger: almost 7,000 units are likely to
take up work following the reform of the EB. All other instruments, on the other hand, have a
similar impact in both reforms. The broadening of the central tax bracket and the alignment of
the tax exempt income quota on the level of single households both have a considerable impact.
The latter is especially strong in the case of males (+6,000 FTE units).
The abolition of the highest marginal tax rate, on the other hand, has the smallest participation
e®ect. The latter was indeed expected as those who are most likely to bene¯t from this reform are
indeed likely to already be economically active. What is quite striking, however, is the negative
e®ect on hours worked of those who are already in employment. Indeed labour supply elasticities
tend to decrease as income increases, and for some households in higher income decile the income
e®ects outweighs the substitution e®ect, giving rise to negative labour supply elasticities.
Considering all the interactions between the di®erent instruments, the combination of the EB
and the tax reform (net of the CIBRAP for employees) has a stronger incentive e®ect than the
reform of the personal income tax alone. In the second scenario the labour supply e®ect is about
11,000 units FTE higher than in the ¯rst scenario (more or less equally shared between males and
females).
12 Let us here recall that there is a higher share of males working over time and that the BE is computed in terms
of equivalent full time income, so that the BE does not entail an incentive to work over time.
126 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the impact of the Belgian 2001 tax reform. The reform has been implemented
gradually and will be fully operational in tax year 2005. In 2004, moreover, the Employment
Bonus partially replaced CIBRAP. The Employment Bonus reform will be fully operational in
2006. Both reforms have been simulated as if they were instantaneously fully implemented. The
analysis therefore neglects the complex rule connected with the progressive implementation of the
reform.
The reforms are assessed considering its potential impact on the labor supply of couples. The
main features of the tax system, however, were not modi¯ed, and little was done to boost incentives
to take up work for people working at a minimum wage. In this concern, we may agree with
De CallataÄ y (2002) who argues that the 2001 tax bill did not bring about a true reform of the tax
system, but merely a generalized reduction of the ¯scal burden that does not alter the existing
incentives structure.
For hourly wages above the minimum level, the reform has unambiguous positive e®ects on
the incentives to take up work. At least for singles. In two earner households, the e®ects of the
reforms are more di±cult to assess without a structural model of labour supply, but the analysis
of the budget constraints allows us to anticipate that the Employment Bonus clearly avoids the
part time trap implicit in the CIBRAP (and already denounced by De CallataÄ y (2002)).
To quantify the potential e®ects on employment, we rely on a discrete hours labor supply
model. The dynamic e®ects of the labor supply are quite small, but statistically signi¯cant. In
particular the econometric analysis con¯rmed the initial intuition based on the analysis of the
budget constraints. While both the tax credit and the employment bonus has positive e®ects on
participation, the latter measure avoids the negative e®ects on the incentives of the population
already at work. The di®erence between the two measures is indeed very important.
The analysis also con¯rms the evidence that labour supply elasticities di®er signi¯cantly in the
di®erent segments of the income distribution. While on average the substitution e®ect dominates
the income e®ects in the bottom of the distribution, this does not always hold in the top of the
distribution. As a consequence not all the instruments appear to be equally e®ective in stimulating
labour supply. In particular, the abolition of the highest marginal tax rates has an ambiguous e®ect
(at least on female labour supply).
It seems at least likely that a di®erent calibration of tax cuts and in-work bene¯ts could
have concentrated labor supply incentives in the range where inactivity traps are most signi¯cant,










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14Tab. 2: Descriptive statistics, population in working age1
Females Males
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Demographical variables
Age 40.901 12.497 40.799 12.557
Married 0.696 0.460 0.695 0.461
Children <3 0.082 0.274 0.078 0.269
Children >3 and <6 0.111 0.314 0.103 0.305
Educational variables
Primary education 0.181 0.385 0.216 0.412
Secondary education 0.361 0.480 0.346 0.476
Tertiary education 0.262 0.440 0.230 0.421
Master or Ph.D. 0.100 0.300 0.115 0.319
Labour market status
Retired 0.063 0.242 0.063 0.244
Disabled 0.037 0.190 0.035 0.183
On maternity leave 0.014 0.116 - -
Student 0.084 0.277 0.087 0.282
Self employed 0.039 0.194 0.064 0.244
Employee 0.539 0.499 0.648 0.478
Unemployed 0.081 0.272 0.051 0.220
Inactive 0.185 0.389 0.084 0.277
Hours worked and wages
Hours worked 17.243 18.020 26.164 20.926
Conditional hours worked 232.871 10.263 41.237 8.279
Hourly wage 2 6.239 0.182 6.374 0.234
Predicted hourly wage 3 6.170 0.196 6.261 0.299
Observations (unweighted) 2,271 2,194
Observations (weighted) 3,466,225 3,025,657
1 All females and males aged between 18 and 65.
2 Conditional on being in employment.
3 Conditional on being either unemployed or inactive.
15Tab. 3: Wage equation for females (with Heckman correction) and
males1
Females Males
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Hourly wage rate (ln)
Primary educ. 0.1934 0.0697 0.2465 0.0475
Secondary educ. 0.4306 0.0698 0.4331 0.0475
Tertiary educ. 0.6498 0.0728 0.6595 0.0486
Master or Ph.D. 0.8382 0.0782 0.8915 0.0530
Potential exp.2 0.2382 0.0520 0.1485 0.0325
Potential exp. sq. -0.0348 0.0149 -0.0015 0.0078
Constant 5.3810 0.0890 5.5857 0.0526
Employment (1=in employment)
Partner is emploed 0.4803 0.0814
nb. children <6 -0.2623 0.1004
Age 1.2263 0.2584
Age sq. -0.1761 0.0309
Primary educ. 0.4118 0.1474
Secondary educ. 0.7453 0.1356
Tertiary educ. or more 1.2719 0.1397








Wald test: joint signi¯cance (Chi2,5) 238.47 -
Wald test: joint signi¯cance (F,6,1384) - 90.7
Wald test: independent eqns (Chi2,1) 3.99 -
RMSE3 0.400 0.366
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1%-level, italic letters refer to the 5%-level and
underlined letters to the 10%-level.
1 Females and males aged between 18 and 65 either employed, unemployed or inactive.
2 Potential experience is de¯ned as current age net of years of schooling and the age when
schooling starts(6).
3 Root of mean squared prediction errors.




Age female 40.613 9.164
Age female sq. 17.333 7.629
Age male 42.531 9.078
Age male sq. 18.912 7.858
Children <6 0.381 0.685













Number of households (unweighted) 1,152
Number of households (weighted) 1,951,289
1 Couples where both members are either employed, inactive or unem-
ployed.
2 Net household monthly income (EUR). Hf and Hm refer to hours
worked by female and male respectively.
17Tab. 5: Conditional Logit: Preference Structure
Coef. Std. Err.
®c Age female -0.1230 0.0665
Age female sq. 0.1380 0.0756
Age male -0.0113 0.0702
Age male sq. 0.0307 0.0776
Constant 3.2636 1.4393
®cc -0.0199 0.0051
®hf Age female -0.0036 0.0021
Age female sq. 0.0064 0.0026
Children < 6 0.0064 0.0027
Constant 0.4310 0.0547
®hhf -0.0033 0.0003
®hm Age male -0.0068 0.0025










Number of obs. 1151
Log-likelihood -2439.42
Wald test: joint signi¯cance (Chi2,4) 8.08
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1%-level, italic letters refer to
the 5%-level and underlined letters to the 10%-level.
18Tab. 6: Observed and predicted frequencies
Weekly working hours Observed Predicted
Females Males frequencies frequencies1
0 0 9.9 9.01
0 40 19.55 21.44
0 50 9.9 8.91
20 0 2.35 3.50
20 40 15.38 13.93
20 50 5.99 6.29
40 0 3.13 3.31
40 40 19.64 18.69
40 50 8.43 9.18
50 0 0.96 0.51
50 40 2.95 3.45
50 50 1.82 1.77
1 Predicted frequencies are computed by averaging up over
the whole sample, each household's probability to chose a
given regime.
Tab. 7: Budgetary Cost of Personal Income Tax Reform and Subsidized SSC for
Low Skilled Employees
SIRe1 Mod¶ et¶ e 2
Reform I Reform I Reform II
CIBRAP (earned income tax credit) 446 423 46
EB (low skilled employees' SSC reduction) - - 599
Increase in °at-rate deduction for working expenses 248 395 163
Broadening of the central tax brackets 769 870 879
Abolition of the highest marginal tax rates 174 327 327
Alignment of tax exempt income quotas 1,091 1,401 1,404
Total 2,727 3,416 3,419
EURO Billion per year.
1 Source: Reynders (2001).
2 Source: Own computations using Mod¶ et¶ e.
Tab. 8: Labor supply elasticities
Females Males
Hours Part. Hours Part.
Own wage elasticity 0.1967 0.1271 0.1753 0.163
(.1799 , .2688) (.1208 , .1829) (.1535 , .1979) (.1456 , .1896)
Cross wage elasticity -0.0327 -0.0239 0.0162 0.0159
(-.07377 , -.0571) (-0.0459 , 0.0381) (-.0011 , .0028) (.0019 , .0066)
Elasticities have been computed numerically by increasing by 1% the gross wage of males and females and recom-
puting optimal labour supply. Labour supply responses are averaged up over the whole sample. The ¯gures in
brackets give the bootstrapped 95% con¯dence interval obtained by drawing 100 independent draws of the parame-
ters from the estimated asymptotic distribution of their estimator, calibrating and computing elasticities for each



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20Fig. 1: Budget lines for two hypothetical households1
1 Remark: Households with two dependent children (aged 4 and 6), working at the 2001 minimum
wage rate (6.6 EUR/hour)
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